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As the doctrine of consideration is one of the most
important principles peculiar to the common law, it is
not strange that there should be many theories put forth
as to its origin. One learned writer attempts to
prove that consideration is the Roman principle of
Causa, filtered through the Court of Chancery (Sal-
mond's History of Contract, 3 L. Q. Rev., 166).
Another traces consideration to the action of debt
(Holmes' The Common Law). A third seeks the origin
in assumpsit (Hare on Contracts); while still another,
declaring that it is, "impossible to refer considera-
tion to a single source," derives the idea of benefit
to the promisor from indebitatus assumpsit, and detri-
2ment to the promisee from the action on the case for
deceit (Ames' History of Assurnpsit, 2 Harvard L. Rev. 1).
The theory advanced by Prof. Ames is, it is sub-
mitted, the true one. He shows that in the twentieth
year of Henry sixth's reign an action was brought where
the defendant promised for 6ne hundred pounds to him
paid, to sell certain lands to the plaintiff, but there-
after enfeoied another of the land. A majority of the
court thought that the action would lie, and by the
time of Henry VII it became settled law that it would.
But a traverse of the feoffment to a stranger was held
good (Y. B., 2 H. VII. 12, pl. 15). The damage to the
plaintiff was clearly as great where the defendant re-
fused to convey as where he conveyed to another; and it
3was not long before the judges allowed the action Upon
refusal to convey,(Keilw,-, 17, pl. 25). The cause of
action was not the promise, but the money paid or act.
done by the plaintiff in reliance thereupon. The de-
ceit of the defendant and the detriment suffered by the
plaintiff were the necessary allegations. The action
was in tort but the step from tort to contract was so
short that it was taken' almost unconsciously. Thus a-
rose one branch of the doctrine of consideration, det-
riment to the prormisee. Judge Here, writing a little
earlier than Prof. Ames, came to the same conclusion
(Hare on Contracts, Chap. VII.).
The other branch of the doctrine, benefit to the
promisor, is plainly traceable to the action of debt.
4Sir Henry Maine has demonstrated, with a clearness
of reasoning and a perspicuity of statement that place
it beyond a doubt, that the theory of Rousseau and his
school (Rousseau's Inquiry, Book T., Chap. .) as to
the original social contract is false; and that primi-
tive society has little or no idea of contractual re-
lations. It is evident, then, that actions for the
possession of property are of earlier date than actions
to enforce promises. So it is probably true that the
action of debt, which is generally thought to be the
earliest contractual action, was originally, not an ac-
tion for enforcing an executory promise to pay money,
but one for the possession of money passed by grant,
ye t remaining in the hands of the grantor (Maine's
5Ancient Law, 311; Langdell's Sumnmary Cont., 99,100;
2 Harvard L. R., 19, note 2). The essential elements
of debt were, that the debtor had received some benefit,
and, that that which he gave in exchange remained in his
possession. Here then we find the element of benefit
to the promisor, and we have but to trace the descent of
this idea from debt to consideration.
The defendant in debt could by waging his law es-
cape liability* this proved to be a great hardship, and
in the latter part of the sixteenth cehtury we find cases
allowing aptions on the promise where the defendant,
being indebted, promised to pay. (Godb., 13: 2 Leon.
203) and in Slade's case, (4 Rep., 94 B,) decided in
1603, it was held that a debtor could be sued. upon an
6implied promise to pay the debt, and that, "every con-
tract executory implied an assumpsit."
origin of indebitatus assumpsit. The
This was the
action was found-
ed, as was debt, on benefit; and from that time to the
present benefit to the promisor has been sufficient con-
sideration to uphold a contract (Ames' Hist. of Assuip-
sit, 1 H. L. Rev.).
Mr. Justice Holmes thinks that benefit to the prom-
isor, quid pro quo, though of similar origin, was dif-
ferently developed. He argues that, as tranaction
witnesses were brought in to prove the debt and, as they
were only allowed to testify to that which they had ac-
tually seen, they could be of use only where property
Hence, debts where propertyhad passed to the debtor.
had not passed could not be proven and were consequent-
ly unenforceable. So it became necessary that the
debtor should receive some benefit, in other words,
a consideration for his promise.
The evidence is slight that consideration is a mod-
ification of the causa of Rom~an law, introduced through
the medium of equity. The principal argument advanced
by those who support that idea, is that consideration
can be traced to no other source; and, for the reason
that the doctrine is applied in equity, it is. more like-
ly that the conmon law has borrowed from equity, than
that equity has borrowed from the common law (3 L. Q.
Rev., 174). But were all positive proof as to the
source wantihg, still would the indications point to a
8common law origin. Consideration, as applied in equi
ty, was loosely defined; the considerations of love
and affection, and moral obligation being included
(Brett vs. J. S. & Wife, Cro. Eliz., 756); while the
consideration of to-day is substantially that of the
early common law; so it is more likely that equity is
indebted to law, than law to equity.
That equity should have appropriated the doctrine
from the common law rather than from Rome is probable
for the resemblance between the Roman causa and the
English consideration is very slight indeed (Pollock
on Contracts, 152).
Consideration Defined.
Consideration itself, as well as its origin, is in
dispute. It would seem at first sight, that a princi-
ple which enters so completely into nearly every rela-
tion of man with his fellow, would be definitely set-
tled. Yet here again we find the savants at vari-
ance.
The definition of consideration most commonly ac-
cepted, is that given by Lush, J., in Currie vs. Misa
(L. R. 10 Ex., 162) which is: "a valuable consideration
in the sense of the law, may consist either in some
right, interest, or profit, or benefit accruing to the
one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or
responsibility, given, suffered, or undettaken by the
9
Prof. Langdell defines it as: "The thing giv-
en or done by the promisee in enchange for the promise. "
(Langdell's Sum. Cont., 45). He strenuously insists
that benefit to the promisor is not a factor, and that
the sole requisite is detriment to the promisee (Sum.
Cont., 62-65); though he acknowledges that benefit to
the promisor was necessary in debt; and says that such
a consideration, if fully executed, is still sufficient
to support the debt; but denies its ability to uphold
other contracts (Sum. Cont., 46).
Coming from such a source, Prof,. Langdell's vigor-
ous effort to change the law to what he thought it ought
to be, has had no inconsiderable effect upon the minds
of the profossion (see 3 L. Q. Rev., 172; Harvard Law
othe r' . ',
11
Rev. ITol. 2 p.l). It does not appear, however, that
any court has as yet sanctioned his doctrine with ju-
dicial approval.
Judge Hare follows substantially the definition of
Pattison, J., in Thomas vs. Thomas (2 Q. B. 851, 859);
"Consideration means something which is of some value
in the eye of the law moving from the plaintiff. It
may be some benefit to the defendant, or some detriment
to the plaintiff, but in all events, it must be moving
from the plaintiff." (see Hare on Contracts, 147).
This latter doctrine, though supported by such em-
inent authority as Hare and Chitty, is somewhat illog-
ical. It is difficult to conceive of a case where the
consideration moving from the promisee is not detrimen-
12
tal to him, and yet is beneficial to the promisor.
Possibly it was this difficulty which Prof. Langdell
perceived and endeavored to obviate, by asserting that
consideration rests solely in detriment to the promisee.
And for all practical purposes, the doctrines of Hare
and Langdell may be considered as the same.
In this country it is quite universally held that
the consideration need not move from the prornisor*
the courts of several states even going so far as to
allow a third person to sue upon a contract made for his
benefit, though the promise is not made to him ( Law-
rence vs. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268; Burr vs. Peers, 24 N.Y.
175). The opposition to this is based, not so much
on the ground that the person suing is not a party to
13
the consideration, as that he is not a parly to the
agreement. The contract can be altered or rescinded
without his consent (dissenting opinion of Comstock, J.,
in Lawrence vs. Fox).
In Farley vs. Cleveland (4 Cowen,432) the defend-
ant agreed with plaintiff to pay an overdue note of
$100., running from one Moon to plaintiff. The consid-
eration was fifteen tons of hay (value $150.) delivered
to defendant by Moon. The Court held that this was
sufficient consideration and allowed plaintiff to recov-
er. It seems as if' $150. worth of hay was ample con-
sideration for a promise to pay a $100. note. The
Court for the Correction of Errors must have so thought,
for they affirmed the decision (9 Cowen, 639), Parley
14
vs. Cleveland has been cited with approval from that
time to the present by the courts of New York and va-
rious other states (69 N. Y. 285: 14 Kas. 497),
In Malone vs. Crescent City Co. (18 Pac. Rep.
858 (Sup. Ct. Cal., 1888)) defendant entered into an
agreement with plaintiff, a creditor of one Murray,
by which defendant was to pay plaintiff $100. for every
run of logs which Murray should-deliver to defendant.
It was held that the contract bol:nd defendant to pay
/
plaintiff that amount for every run so delivered, wheth.
er defendant owed Murray anything or not.
The acceptance of a bill of exchange is not found-
ed on a consideration moving from the promisee. The
consideration moves from the drawer to the acceptor.
15
It may be set up in opposition to this that, "when sued,
the acceptor is estopped from denying a consideration."
That is true.-- But what consideration? Not a consid-
eration m6ving from the promisee, for he knows that
there is none moving from him; and the acceptor's de-
nial that there is any such will work no fraud. The
acceptor is simply estopped from denying a consideration
moving from the drawer, and that is the consideration
which is presumed, and which supports the promise.
It is submitted that the rule that consideration
may move from a third Party ought to, and will prevail
over that laid down in Thomas vs. Thomas (2 Q.. B., 851,
859), though Thomas vs. Thomas is supported by such em-
inertt writers as Chitty, Hare, and Langdell. For it
16
is evident that injustice would be done in cases sim-
ilar to Farley vs. Cleveland were the contract not up-
held. The whole history of contract, in the English
and in other systems of jurisprudence, shows that the
tendency is to enlarge, rather than to abridge the
scope of promises, until all promises are enforced
which ought, upon grounds of reason and equity, to be
enforced. There is no reason to suppose that the rule
which is fo-unded in equity and good conscience will not,
in this case, prevail.
17
Classes of Cons iderat ion
Consideration was divided by the earlier writers
into two classes; good, and valuable. A good consid-
eration being one of natural love and affection (2 Black.
Com., 297; Ellis vs. Nimmo, Lloyd and G. Rep., 333).
The equity courts for a time upheld this doctrine, per-
fecting imperfect conveyances and enforcing c-ontracts
based on the meritorious consideration of love and af-
fection (Ellis vs. Nimmo, supra; Pomeroy's Equity jur.,
588 and cases cited). But it is now quite well set-
tled that a meritorious consideration is not sufficient
either in equity, or at law (Young vs. Young, 80 N. Y.,
422; Phillips vs. Fry, 14 Allen 36; Jefferys vs. Jef-
ferys, I Crai. & Phil., 137; WVhitaker vs. Whitaker, 52
18
N. Ye, 368). Such a consideration is still, however,
upheld in Kentucky. The doctrine was inculcated there
by McIntire vs. Hughes (4 Bibb, 1863). The courts of
that state have ever since been limiting that case, but
it has not, as yet, been expressly overruled (Cotton
vs. Graham, 2'S. W. Rep., 647).
Lord Mansfield essayed to introduce a third class.
In the case of Hawkes vs. Saunders (1 Cowper, 289) he
held that if one who was bo-ind in morals, increased the
tie by an express promise, that promise might be en-
forced, the moral obligation being a sufficient consid-
eration. The annotators of Wennall vs. Adney (3 B.
& P. 2147) in an exaustive note comrbatted the doctrine.
They endeavored to show that the so-called moral obli-
19
gation was not effective as a consideration, and that
the decisions to that effect should be based on the
ground of waiver.
The note to Wennall vs. Adney has been more often
followed than the rule laid dovrn by Lord Mansfield.
And it now quite generally held that a promise to pay
a debt contracted in infancy, or barred by the Statute
of Limitations, or by a discharge in bankruptcy, is
enforceable as a waiver. The doctrine being that a
person can waive any right introduced by the law for
his benefit which does not extingiilsh the original
debt, but is merely a bar to the remedy.
The doctrine of moral obligation is fast fading
out of view, though it has not, as is stated by one
20
learned writer, completely disappeared (see Langdell's
Sum. Cont., 71). For in Pennsylvania, in which state
it is held that a discharge in bankruptcy completely
extinguishes the debt, a promise to pay such debt is
upheld on the ground of moral obligation. If the orig-
inal promise is declared on a demurrer will be sustained.
The subsequent promise is held to b6 the cause of ac-
tion (lurphy vs. Crawford, 114 Pa. St., 496; Bolton vs.
King, 105 Pa. St., 78). in Stebbins vs. Crawford
(92 Pa. St.,289, 292) a promise to pay a claim settled
by judgment was held valid, because the judgment was
too small. In other states decisions are based on
moral obligations which might well be upheld on better
grounds (Craig vs. Seitz, 30 N. W. Rep. (,MAich,) 347;
21
Wizlizenus vs. 0'Fallon, 91 Mo., 181).
So we may conclude that there is, except in a few
states, but one kind of consideration recognized in the
law, namely, valuable consideration.
This valuable consideration must be something
which the law deems as of value; thus giving up a con-
tract voidable under the Statute of Frauds (Haigh vs.
Brooks, 10 A. & Ee, 309); but not the relinquiB hing
of a void one (Barnard vs. Simonds, 1 Rolle's Ab., 26,
p1. 39); forbearance of suit on a well founded claim
(Elting vs. Vanderlyn, 4 John., 237); an assignment
(1 Sid.,212); any work or services rendered to a prom-
isor or to a third person; reposing trust or confidence;
a promise to do a lawful' act; subscriptions to a coi'lmon
22
cause may beco,- e each a consideration for the others
(Trustees vs. Stetson, 5 Pick., 506); allowing boilers
to be weighed, the giving up of possession being the det.
riment (Brainbridge vs. Firmistone, 8 A. & E., 743).
Partin with possession is the consideration on
which most writers base the liability of the gratuitous
bailee (Story on Bailments, 171 a; Edwards on Bailments,
73; Schouler on Bailments, 41). To admit this doc-
trine wovlId be to wrest away the foundation and leave
at the mercy of the shifting sands an important branch
of the law of bailrments. If there is any considera-
tion at all it will uphold any promise. The bailee
could be held to the greatest care; or as insurer.
His liability would commence before delivery, for a
23
promise to deliver is, in the eye of the lw, as val-
uable as actual delivery.
Adequacy o f Consideration
It is not necessary that the consideration shovild
be equal in value to the promise. The Court will not
set itself up as a scale holder to weigh the respec-
tive values of the consideration and the subject mat-
ter. Each party has received what he bargained for,
and so long as it is of value, he will not be heard to
say that it is not enough (Earl vs. Peck, 64 N. Y.,
596). Though, where the values are conclusively
fixed by law, a thing of less value will not be a suf-
ficient consideration for a thing of greater (Bailey
vs. Day, 26 Me., 88).
In eqtity, inadequacy of consideration may be a
bg o rd ere inadequacy alone will not, ac.
24
badge of fraud,
25
cording to the better opinion, be a ground for recission
or for refusing specific performance; unless the inad-
acuacy be so gross as to amount to positive fraud (por.
Equity Jur., 926, 927).
26
Where Consideration is Necessary
Contracts in our law are of two kinds: formal,
and simple; the former depending upon form, the latter
upon consideration, for their validity.
Were the above statements strictly true, formal
contracts might be eliminated from the discussion-.
But formal contracts belong to a comparatively early
stage of civilization. They are the first class of
contracts, originating when the conception of contracts
is as yet in embryo. With the onward march of human
progress more and more atteition is paid to substance
and less to form, until finally form is entirely dis-
regarded. We have not reached that stage at present,
though it seems that we are quite rapidl.y nearing the
27
go al.
Contracts under -eal did not, at first, require
any consideration. The general rule is now that in
a sealed instrument the lavw conclusively presuznes a
consideration; but if the actual consideration is ille-
gal, or immoral, the presence of a seal will not save
the contract (Cooch vs. Goodman, 2 A. & E., n.s., 580).
In 'many states the seal is but presumptive evidence of
consideration" and in others all distinction between
sealed and unsealed instrments is abolished (Por.
Equity Jur., 70; Stimson's Am. Stat. Law, 1564).
Contracts of record, being entered into before the
court, do not require a consideration.
It is a general rule that all simple contracts
28
require, and are upheld by, a consideration. Lord
Mansfield is responsible for an attempt to take con-
tracts in writing out of the rule. Tn Pillans vs
VanMierop (3 Burr., 1663) he gave it as his opinion
that consideration was not necessary to a contract in
writing. This novel doctrine was not allowed to stand
unchallenged for any length of time; and thirteen years
later in Rann vs. Hughes (7 Term Rep., 350, note a)
it was decided that the rule of Pillans vs. VanMierop
was unsound, and that contracts in writing stood upon
the same footing as oral contracts. Rann vs. Hughes
has since been universally followed by the courts (Cook
vs. Bradley, v Conn., 57; Burnett vs. Bisco, 4 john.,
235; Bishop on Contracts, 24).
29
The last decade has shown us another endeavor to
take a certain class of contracts out of the scope of
consideration. For this attempt k-je are indebted to
Prof. Langdell (Langdell's Sum. Cont., 53). He insists
that consideration is not necessary to contracts gov-
erned by the law merchant: bills of exchange, policies
of insurance, and promissory notes. The reasons he
gives as to promissory notes and bills of exchange are:
1. That in declaring on them the making of the in-
struzment is stated, then that defendant became liable,
and in consideration of being so liable he promised.
2. That a promissory note for a pre-existing debt
would be invalid if it required a consideration.
6. That a uavee of a bill of excviange could not sie
30
the acceptor if a consideration was necessary.
4. That if they were mere parol promises the holder
could only sue upon the original consideration.
5. That a bill or note, if paid at maturity, operates
as payment of a debt.
To his first premise, it is sufficient answer
that proof ofOno consideration is a defence. As to
reason for thus declaring on promissory notes, see
Hare on Contracts, p. 256. Regarding his second
proposition, the payee has put it out of' his power,
accepting the note, to collect the debt during the
by
interval. That is surely sufficient consideration
on his part. And the making of a note which the pay-
ee can negotiate, and on which the maker is liable to
31
third persons regardless of any set off or defence
between the parties, is a good consideration for for-
bearance. In answer to the third proposition, the
funds of the drawer in the drawee' s hands are the con-
sideration. That the acceptor is bound, whether he has
funds or not, is to be accounted for on the ground, of
estoppel. A bona fide holder of a promissory note,
for which there was no consideration, is allowed to
sue for the following reason: The maker, by placing
his name on a negotiable note, is estopped from deny-
ing, to the injury of innocent purchasers, that there was
no consideration. It is not that a note is made valid
without consideration, but that a party will not be al-
lowed to work a fraud upon innocent third parties.
32
Prof. Langdell's last proposition does not help to
prove that a bill or note is valid without considera-
tion. Though he says, 'it is vary clear upon prin-
ciple that these contracts do not require any consid-
erat ion." The simlle fact that want of consideration
is a complete defence shows that consideration is nec-
essary. The same answer may be given to his arguments
that insurance policies do not require consideration.
There are certain quasi-contracts which do not re-
quire a consideration, these are estoppel and waiver.
Estoppel is based on the prevention of fraud, and wai-
ver on the reasoning that a person is not obliged to
accept & benefit tendered to him by the law.
WTat has heretofore been said as to the necessity
33
for consideration, applies to executory contracts only.
As a general rule executed contracts do not require a
consideration (Casey's Appeal, 36 Conn., 88). But
where property has been transfered to the injury of
creditors, the consideration may be inquired into, and
absence of consideration will be evidence of fraud
(Young vs. Heermans, 66 N. Y. 374).
34
Past Consideration
In contradistinction to cases where the receipt
of the consideration is cotemporary with the promise,
are cases where the consideration is executed, or more
properly speaking, past. These cases have given rise
to many fine distinctions and a vast quantity of dic-
ta; though in latter years the litigated cases seem not
to be very frequent.
It was early held that a past consideration would
not slapport a promise. The same case, however, which
established that doctrine, mentioned an exception to the
rule. The exception was, that wherever the past con-
sideration ensued at the request of the defendant, it
wvould support a promise on his part (Hint vs. Bate,
The rule of Hunt vs. Bate h:".s been the
accepted doctrine ever since (Lampleigh vs. Brathwaite,
1 . 358; Comstock4ob., 105; Chaffee vs, Thomas, 7 Cowen,
vs. Smith, 7 John., 87; Parsons on Cont., 391). The
reason given for the exception to the rule is, that the
prom:ise relates back to the consideratin, and the re-
quest, the act, and the promise thus form one connected
transaction (Bishop on Cont., 91).
The soundness of the doctrine, it seems with reason,
has been questioned (Anson on Cont., 85-90: Langdell's
Sum. Cont., 90-98). if we cast aside the worn--thread-
bare doctrine of moral obligation, it is difficult to
see any reason why a promise founded on past consider-
ation should ever be enforced. T
Dyer, 272 4)a
he law implies a prolm-
36
ise to pay for a benefit rendered on request. The
subsequent express promise is but evidence as to value.
The cases of Roscorla vs. Thomas (3 Q. B., 234) and
Kaye vs. Dutton (7 M.& G., 807) hold that the only
promise which will be upheld by a past consideration,
is that which the law ir plies. Roscorla vs. Thomas
appears not to have been questioned, except in one
Irish case (Bradford vs. Roulston, 8 ITr. Com. Law, 468).
Upon the authority of Roscorla vs. Thomas it may
truthfully be said that, in legal effect,past consid-
eration is no consideration.
present it w:ould support any promise.
Were any consideration
Thus has con-
sideration been freed from one more clinging barnacle.
Failure o f Consideration
Where there is a failure of consideration the promisor
is released. He has not received that in return for
which the promise was made. The effect is the same
as if there never was a consideration (Parsons on Cont.,
386; Essery vs. Cowland, 26 Ch. Div., 191).
The difficulty is encountered where there is a
failure of part of the consideration. Where part is
illegal or imnoral, and the illegal part cannot be sep-
arated from the good, its illegality will taint the en-
tire contract (Best vs. Jolly, 1 Sid., 38; Widoe vs.
Webb, 20 0. St., v431; Gerlach vs. Skinner, 34 Kas.,86;
Barton vs. Plank Road, 17 Barb., 337; Perkins vs. Cum-
Where the illegal can be separ-
37
min-s, 2 Gray, 258).
38
arated from the good, the contract will be avoided pro
tanto, and valid so far as the good consideration ex-
tends (Chase. -' s Ex'rs vs. Burkholder, 18 Pa. St., 48).
So far the sky is comparatively clearbut clouds
soon obscure the light. Wiere there is simply a fail-
ure of part of the consideration is the contract a-
voided? Clearly there is no meeting of minds, but,
nevertheless, it has been held that the contract is bind.
ing. Leavin? the promisor to his cross action (Par-
sons on Cont.., 386; Franklin Vs. Miller, 4 A. & E., 599;
Hall vs. Minturn, 55 N. Y., 676; Jenness vs. Parker,
24 Me., 289). This doctrine is founded on the rule
that, s0 long as there is any consideration, the courts
will not enquire into its adequacy (Bishop on Cont.,
39
74), but t'.e reason of the rule fails here. The prom-
isor has not received that which he barg ained for.
He has not agreed to the inrcdequate consideration.
Tt seems to be the better doctrine that where the
failure is of a substantial part of the consideration
the promisor is entitled to treat the contract as re-
scinded (Giles vs. Edward, 7 Term Rep.,18; Bowes vs.
Shand, L. R., I Q. . Div., 470; s.c., 2 App. Cases,
455.467; Norrington vs. Right, 115 U. S., 188, 204)w
In the words of a learned writer: "An entire consider-
ation which fails partially, fails wholly : and the
court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the extent
of the difference, or whether justice would be done
by allowing plaintiff to recover :rith an allownce for
40
the loss." (Hare on Contracts,%l ).
The subject is a complicated one, involving a
large part of the law of sales. A complete discussion
of it would necessitate more space than can here be
given; and the writer leaves it for the" consideration"
of wiser heads than his.
